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ABSTRACf 
Multiple Personality Disorder and the Dissociative Disorders are 
characterized by the subjective experiences of extreme fragmentation, 
disorganization, and disintegration. VVhile our current system of classi-
fications identifies these experiences as central to dissociation, clinicians 
have been limited in their alJility to describe the nature of these states 
specifically. Recent findings from developmental psyclwlogy and infant 
research provide observational data which describe stages of self develop-
ment. The careful focus in this work on defining and descrilJing the 
domains of self experience provides a useful framework for studying 
Dissociative Disorders. 
INTRODUCfION 
The past decade has been a time of rapid advances in the 
study of the dissociative disorders and of Multiple Personality 
Disorder (MPD). Despite this burgeoning interest, or perhaps 
because of it, current theory and research in the field is troub-
led by a set of definitional problems. We are still limited by dif-
ficulties in precisely describing and defining the extreme states 
of disorganization and fragmentation which our patients re-
port as part of their personal experience. It is in describing 
these extreme states that the growing field of developmental 
psychology and infant research may provide some assistance. 
Developmentalists are rewriting the text of the growing 
infant's capacities, and of the infant's inner world. While early 
life experiences have often been recognized as central to con-
siderations of later developmental achievements, as well as to 
many forms of psychopathology, it is only recently that we have 
been able to acquire and study direct observational data about 
infants to get a sense of both normal parameters and pathologi-
cal developmental lines. In contrast to most developmental 
theories, which have been retrospectively derived from work 
with adults in psychotherapy, recent developmental theories 
are the product of direct prospective observation of infants and 
children. The challenge of integrating this new research with 
clinically useful psychodynamic constructs has become the 
province of a number of clinical researchers, and particularly of 
Daniel Stern. 
In his book The Interpersonal World of the Infant (Stern, 1985) 
Stern suggests that the infant can best be understood from the 
perspective of how he/she subjectively experiences and organ-
izes his inner world. He describes four levels of self organiza-
tion, supported by observational data from infant studies, each 
of which heralds a radical restructuring of how the child expe-
riences himself in the world. The first two years of life ideally 
bring the sequential achievement of a sense of an emergent 
self, core self, intersubjective self, and verbal self (Stern, 1983, 
1985). He states that each of these new levels of self organiza-
tion establishes a context within which all other ongoing life 
issues will be handled. 
How can these findings from infant research be of use to cli-
nicians working with patients with MPD and dissociative pathol-
ogy? The dissociative defense results in profound and specific 
alterations in the individual's sense of self. In contrast to other 
defensive processes, including denial and repression (in which 
specific events or fantasies are barred from consciousness and 
the sense of self remains intact) , dissociation implies a radical 
alteration in the sense of self. The I which remains intact when 
other defenses are employed is not maintained in dissociation, . 
and dissociated content becomes not me experience. The 
essence of the pathological process operative in MPD is de-
signed to satisfy one injunction: That did not happen to me, it 
happened to another. We are limited in our ability to describe 
these not me experiences, these extreme states of fragmenta-
tion, disorganization, and disintegration which our patients 
report as their subjective experiences. As a result, we run into 
a problem of nosology in which the extremes of dissociative 
experience are categorized as polyfragmented multiplepersonalities, 
personality fragments (Braun, 1986) and ego states (Watkins & 
Watkins, 1982). While all of these emphasize the underlying 
dissociative mechanism being used, they do not aid us clinically 
. in specifically defining or describing the nature of the individual's 
experiences. 
Stern addresses this dilemma directly and defines the devel-
opmental domain of the core self, which may help us in describ-
ing experiences of fragmentation more precisely. The achieve-
ment of the secure sense of being a unified integrated person is 
described as part of core self. It is in the context of core self 
development that the infant and subsequently the adult devel-
ops and maintains 
"the sense of being an integrated, distinct, coherent body 
with control over his own actions, ownerships of his own af-
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fectivity, a sense of continuity, and a sense of others as 
distinct and separate interactants" (Stem, 1985, p. 99). 
Stem suggests that the four self invariants of agency, coher-
ence, self affectivity, and continuity, while constituting the 
specific developmental material of the second to seventh 
months oflife, remain essential aspects of experience through-
out the life span. It is these invariants which are the ele-
ments of the secure sense of bodily or core self (Stem, 1985) . 
Disturbances of development related to these invariants 
can be found in specific forms of psychopathology: 
Absence of agency can be found in catatonia, hysterical 
paralysis derealization and some paranoid states in which 
authorship of action is taken over. Absence of coherence 
can be manifest in depersonalization, fragmentation and 
psychotic experiences of merger and fusion. Absence of af-
fectivity can be seen in anhedonia and some schizophren-
ics, and absence of continuity can be seen in fugue and of 
other dissociative states" 
(Stem, 1985, p. 71). 
It is precisely in these areas of core self that patients with 
MPD are most profoundly disturbed. Certainly patients with 
MPD experience disturbances in both the intersubjective and 
the verbal domains. However, the individuals with dissociative 
disorders have a profound disturbance of identity which is rooted 
in bodily perceptions and in their difficulties in organizing 
somatic experience. The defining characteristics of dissociation 
seem to be most fundamentally rooted in the core self. We can 
learn more about the nature of MPD and the process of disso-
ciation by thinking of them in terms of disturbances in Stem's 
four invariants in the domain of core self. Here I will attempt to 
briefly present each of the elements of the core self and discuss 
each in terms of clinical work with patients with dissociative 
illnesses. 
MULTIPLE PERSONALTIY DISORDER AND THE 
CORESELF 
The first self invariant of the core self that Stem describes is 
agency. He breaks this down into: (a) the sense that volition 
precedes a motor act, (b) the proprioceptive feedback that 
does or does not occur during the act, and (c) the predictabilty 
of consequences that follow the act (Stem, 1976, p. 76). It 
relates, then, to a primary sense of being embodied and to being 
able to discern a unity of bodily function and action. It is 
captured by the statement, "My body initiated this action." 
Deficiencies in this capacity are plain in individuals with MPD in 
descriptions of experiences of passive influence, of being con-
tolled by an outside agent, and in a general sense of inability to 
rely on themselves as an agent, one who predictably initiates 
and completes tasks with their body. 
A twenty-eight year old male patient with MPD has a long 
history of masochistic behavior. He has routinely harmed his 
body by repeated laceration, burning, hitting, head banging, 
etc. What is most remarkable about his experience is that he 
reports being unaware of initiating or continuing these ac-
tions as they are happening. Instead, he characteristically 
reports a feeling of anxiety or dread that something bad is 
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going to happen to him; that he is going to be a victim of an 
assault which he subjectively experiences as being initiated by 
another agent outside his control. He also has experiences of 
parts of his body functioning outside of his conscious control. 
One leg might shake dramatically or one hand open and 
close forming a fist. At one point when several alters were 
actively in conflict, he experienced an uncoordination in his 
gait and felt that he did not have full coordination of his legs 
or trunk to exercise voluntary control over walking. 
This patient had a disorganization in his experience of being 
an integrated physical being with control over the initiation and 
continuance of his actions. This is, in Stem's terms, a distur-
bance of agency in the domain of the core self. 
Where self agency concerns the growing experience of one-
self as reliable initiator of actions, self coherence concerns self 
boundaries and fundamental distinctions between self and other. 
This is the class of interpersonal experiences that define one as 
a single bounded physical entity. Stem describes a group of ex-
periences which establish self coherence: (a) unity oflocus; (b) 
coherence of motion; (c) coherence of temporal structure; (d) 
coherence of intensity structure; and (e) coherence of form 
(Stem, 1985) . Through his interpersonal experiences the in-
fant begins to organize experience around variability in these 
spheres. Other individuals in the environment are experienced 
as coherent based on the reliable and predictable repetition of 
interactions in these domains. As another is discovered to be co-
herent as a physical entity, so the infant learns of his own coher-
ent physical presence. Dissociative pathology in the realm of 
self coherence is manifested in the switching process and in the 
experience of oneself as multiple. The uncertainty of one's own 
invariance in relation to another is markedly disturbed in MPD 
as reflected by the statement: I am not the same person when I am 
with X as when I am with Y The host of specialized idiosyncratic 
shifts of attitude, posture, and presentation manifested by dif-
ferentalternate personalities in different circumstances reflects 
a failure in self coherence. Rather than feeling that one inte-
grated personality can adapt to the varying demands of the 
environment, the MPD patient relies on a series of separate 
selves. One woman with MPD writes in her journal: 
I caught a glance of my face in the mirror. It was the first 
time that I was consciously aware of some kind of separate-
ness. I felt like I was outside the body as an observer of 
something totally bizarre to me. It was my face in the mirror 
but it felt as though it was someone else. There was a vicious 
expression on the face, and I was aware of this person saying 
to drown myself in the tub or kill myself in some way and kept 
attacking verbally and viciously about what trash I was. Almost 
immediately there was change to a little girl's expression on 
the face and she started crying saying "why are you doing this 
to me, please leave me alone. Don't do this." Immediately it 
switched to the vicious one attacking again and saying how I 
must die, etc. This went back and forth for some time and the 
whole time felt like an outside observer. 
The failure of the sense of a coherent self is evident in both 
the content and form of this clinical vignette. The content 
reveals the patient's sense of having several unintegrated as-
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pects with differential experiences occurring simultaneously 
within her body. The inconsistency and confusion about the 
descriptive pronouns she uses in writing about this event sup-
ports the lack of coherence in her sense of having a unified 
identity. She refers to herself as 1, the face, this person, she, me, until 
she finally in the last sentence deletes the personal pronouns 
entirely and writes "the whole time felt like an outside observer." 
The person is lost entirely. 
The third invariant aspect of the core self which becomes a 
central developmental focus (organizer) for the infant is self 
affectivity. It is during this period that the infant begins to be 
able to distinguish his own emotional states and define them as 
part of himself rather than as part of the environment or whom-
ever might elicit them. The invariant self affectivi ty includes the 
growing recognition of "proprioceptive feedback from particu-
lar motor outflow patterns to the face, respiration and vocal 
apparatus" (Stem, 1987, p. 89). In keeping with the works of 
Izard (1977) and Tompkins (1987), Stem considers the affects 
to be highly organized arousal systems. The invariant self affec-
tivity refers to the child's growing yet rudimentary sense that the 
autonomic discharge associated with his differen tstates of arousal 
are an expectable and acceptable part of him, and that they are 
beginning to take on a stable organization in the context of his 
life experience. 
Mistrust of self affectivity is a cornerstone of dissociative pa-
thology. The severely traumatized individual has not learned to 
rely on stable affective experience, but instead experiences emo-
tion as disintegrating. Either as a primary response to trauma, 
i.e. an inability to integrate overwhelming neurophysiologic 
stimuli, or as a secondary response based on the conditions 
implicit in the traumatic circumstances, the MPD patient is 
unable to rely on a secure, well modulated pattern of affective 
arousal. There is then a resultant insecurity as to how affect will 
be experienced, an insecurity as to whether the physiologic 
components of affective states will follow a predictable pattern 
of increasing and decreasing intensity or whether they will be 
experienced unpredictably and as chaotically disorganized and 
overwhelming. 
In patients with MPD, this deficit is seen most grossly in the 
establishment of alternate personalities which have discrete 
and limited affective spectra. For instance, one personality will 
experience and express all the angry affect and another person-
ality all the sad affect. The individual does not experience a 
smooth integration of contrasting or conflicting affective states. 
This can result in the ongoing mistrust and misperception of 
autonomic affective cues, such that the adultMPD patient cannot 
accurately discern discrete affects. The patient cannot translate 
the somatic experiences of sadness, joy, excitement or anger, 
into personal experience as reflected by the statement "I feel 
sad." This is a failure of discrimination and a lack of tolerance 
of affect at the level of the core self. 
A young woman with MPD presents herself as remarka-
bly pleasant, cooperative and ingratiating. Throughout the 
course of her extended psychotherapy, she is without com-
plaint or criticism; unable to register or acknowledge frustra-
tion or irritation about many small interruptions and incon-
veniences in the therapy or about the limiting realities of her 
inpatient hospitalization. She is most importantly unable to 
express anger in the context of discussion of traumatic epi-
sodes, but instead experiences nausea, anxiety, or feels sad 
and tearful. After much therapy, she finally acknowledges 
that one might have angry feelings towards an assailant. She 
states without affect, flatly and intellectually: "If I felt anger I 
would explode. I would be like a raging volcano. I would 
destroy things." Late in the therapy this patien t has revealed 
an enraged alternate personality who expresses the angry 
feelings towards her injurers. This affective expression is not 
yet recognized by the primary personality. Since its emer-
gence, she is able to recall the content of this alters statements 
but not the affect. The primary personality when reflecting 
on similar or identical content continues to experience a 
mixture of somatic symptoms and is unable to identifY her 
predominant affective state. 
In this case the dissociative defense is used primarily to dis-
avow intolerable and overwhelming affect. The subjective expe-
rience of being a unified person, with an intact sense of self, is 
lost in her inability to handle her affective states. 
Stem writes, "A sense of core self would be ephemeral if 
there were no continuity of experience . . . the infant capacity 
necessary for this form of continuity is memory" (Stem, 1985, p . 
90). The emerging capacity for memory of experience and 
events is the glue which joins the other three invariant aspects of 
the core self. Current research offers support for pre-verbal 
memory systems which provide continuity of experience in all 
three domains; a motor memory (Olson & Strauss, 1984), per-
ceptual memory (Fagan, 1973), and affective memory (Emde, 
1983). Stem asserts that infants have the ability to constitute, 
store, and update memory in these three domains. Experience 
in the other three domains (self coherence, agency, and affec-
tivity), is integrated through memory and gives rise to an emer-
gent construct which is greater than the sum of the separate in-
gredients. Memory allows the synthesis which gives rise to the 
new organizing subjective perspective of the core self. The converse 
is also true. Experience in the core self domains contributes to 
the establishment of the sense of continuity or history. Emde 
describes how the internal stability of affective patterns contrib-
utes to self development. 'The proprioceptive feedback from 
smiling or crying remains the same from birth to death. For this 
reason our affective core guarantees our continuity of experi-
ence across development in spite of the many ways we change" 
(Emde, 1983, p,iii.). Our core self experiences ideally provide 
the stability which reinforces our subjective experience of con-
tinuity over time. 
The research findings establishing the centrality of memory 
in the maintenance of a unified sense of self have direct bearing 
on clinical findings in patients with MPD. As described earlier, 
dissociative pathology reflects an essential disorganization in 
the experience of being the same person over time. It is the 
manifestation of a disturbance in the domain of self continuity 
of self history. Amnestic periods, fugue states, dissociation, loss 
of time, and memory lapses for circumscribed events all suggest 
disturbances of self continuity. The use of dissociation and 
swjtching to alternate personalities negates the possibility of a 
sustained coherent self history. The inability to maintain an 
uninterrupted scheme of personal experience impinges on the 
individual's subjective sense of being essentially the same per-
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son over time. Disturbances in memory in patients with MPD 
create the constant uncertainty as to what they have done, what 
they have seen and what they have felt. Separation of memory 
systems by the utilization of different personalities reinforces 
the individuals' experience of not being a single unified person 
with a continous life history and creates the sense of being many 
different individuals with discrete histories inexplicably con-
tained in a single body. 
The histories we get from patients with MPD are unique in 
several respects. For the clinician the discontinuities and diffi-
culties in establishing a coherent chronology of events is charac-
teristic. There is a quality of gaping holes or memory lacunae in 
the early history taking. Later, as separate alters are discovered, 
the history, as pieced together by the outsider, becomes more 
consistent, but this is not initially the experience of the patien t, 
who instead, has the unsettling awareness of having parallel 
histories. Some alters have discrete, entirely separate bits of his-
torical information, while other alters have different versions of 
familiar events. The patient may struggle with the question, 
''which is the real me?" One patient described the disturbing 
sense of being several different people, with different life sto-
ries, painfully trapped in one body, At times, this patient would 
feel outof control; i.e., that she could not keep other alters from 
emerging. If other alters could gain executive control of the 
body they then could dictate which version of past even ts would 
be accepted as the true one, and thereby define the true me. 
DISCUSSION 
Stem's synthesis of recent advances in infant research offers 
a theory for the emergence of a series of qualitatively unique 
states of subjective self organization. During the first six months 
oflife, the infant establishes a core self by way of his interactions 
in the domains described. The result of these experiences is the 
sense of being embodied, of being a physical person in a world 
which holds the potential for physical intimacy. With a core self 
development underway, the groundwork is prepared for the 
next realm of self experience. Stem describes the new capabili-
ties of the intersubjective self: 
The potential of self and of other has been greatly ex-
panded. Selves and others now include inner or subjective 
states of experience in addition to the overt behaviors and 
direct sensations that marked the core self and other ... Inter-
subjective relatedness and the development of the intersub-
jective self marks the first awareness of separate minds, differ-
ent points of view held by self and other and also the possibil-
ity of sharing and communicating these subjective states . . . 
Psychic intimacy as well as physical intimacy is now possible 
(Stem, 1985, pp. 125-126). 
The ideal outcome of this latter developmental epoch is the 
capacity for emotional intimacy. The pathological result, isola-
tion. While it is clear that concerns of empathic failure are 
significant in traumatized patients with MPD, I contend that this 
is not the area of primary disturbance. As detailed above, the 
pathologic findings inherent in MPD, reflects a predominant 
disorganization in core self experience. The characteristic traits 
which define dissociation illness are more closely linked to dis-
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turbances of the sense of self as whole, intact, and volitional, 
than to concerns of self with other. Stem is careful to describe 
the interdependence of core self and intersubjective self in the 
life of the growing individual, but eschews the notion that later 
development displaces earlier: 
Intersubjective relatedness does not displace core related-
ness, nothing ever will. It is the existential bedrock of inter-
personal relations. When the domain of inter subjective relat-
edness is added, core relatedness and intersubjective related-
ness coexist and interact. Each domain affects the experience 
of the other (Stern, 1985, p. 125). 
It is important to emphasize that the developmental ap-
proach described is grounded in the premise of lifespan devel-
opmentallines. As first put forward by Anna Freud (1965), the 
concept of developmental lines strives to describe the matura-
tional sequence of events which occur in all areas of the person-
ality. She describes the parallel developmental processes which 
occur in all spheres of the ego from the dependence of early 
infancy to the consolidation of the more mature well-defined 
ego capacities of the adult (Freud, 1965). The developmental 
stages of an individual's subjective sense of self reflect the trans-
lation of many of these ego capacities into organized systems 
which define one's experience of self and other in the world. In 
this light, the successive levels of self development are under-
stood as subjective organizations through which experience is 
filtered. A six month old infant experiences events exclusively in 
the domain of core relatedness. An eighteen month old will 
have an additional capacity for intersubjective understanding. 
Each of these levels of organization, however, will be a contin-
ued source of information about others and about the self 
throughout the individual's life. What is significant for consid-
eration of individuals with MPD is the possibility of differential 
failures or setbacks in each domain. It may be that core and 
intersubjective self experience are differentially affected by 
pathogenic physical truma. Either the magnitude or frequency 
of profound trauma may selectively and differentially alter function 
at the level of core self more than at the level of intersubjective 
self. That is, physical trauma may cause particularly physical 
psychic wounds with resultant deficits in the realm of bodily 
somatic self perceptions. The consequences of physical and 
sexual trauma for the young child obtain most directly to uncer-
tainty for the individual's perceptions of and relation to his or 
her body, to aspects of core self experiences, including sense of 
agency, coherence, and affectivity. The magnitude of incestu-
ous trauma disturbs the child's gradually emerging security in 
the sphere of his existence as a physical being. Disturbances in 
the realm of core self mirror the quality of dissociative 
experience. 
While I maintain that core self experiences form the bed-
rock of dissociative experience, this is not in any way to suggest 
a post-traumatic regression to a level of function commensurate 
with early infancy, but rather to suggest that disorganization 
occurs in comparable spheres. In keeping with the notion of de-
velopmentalline, the achievements which are first identified in 
infancy continue to develop throughout the lifespan and re-
quire support to be maintained in the face of environmental 
change. Each of the domains of self experience will be selec-
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tively maintained in the context of the individual's ongoing 
interpersonal interactions. 
CONCLUSION 
Inclusion of a developmen tal pe~spective offers a number of 
advantages to the study and treatment of patients with MPD and 
dissociative disorders. In keeping with recent work which has 
emphasized the childhood antecedents of MPD (Kluft, 1985), 
findings from developmental psychology provide a detailed 
normative frame of reference by means of which pathological 
disturbances can be evaluated. The conceptualization of the 
stages of self-experience and organization as discrete develop-
mental lines allows us to describe syndromes characteristic of 
each developmental domain and to differentiate among these 
areas of disturbance. The clinical findings, common to patients 
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